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CURRENT LEGISLATION
under the Uniform Act.° 3 Such a provision is necessary for many state ad-
ministrators and the Securities Exchange Commission" have taken the po-
sition that employees' benefit plans involve an offering of a security and
thus are subject to registration under blue sky laws if there is no statutory
exemption.
CONCLUSION
As evidenced by the above amendments, the states are realizing the
shortcomings of their existing blue sky laws in the areas which demand
uniformity. The amendments demonstrate the trend of the states to follow
the lead of the Uniform Securities Act in providing this uniformity. No
doubt this does produce a degree of uniformity among state blue sky laws,
but it is slow and unorganized. It would seem far better for a state to
start with the Uniform Securities Act and amend it to serve the needs of
the state, rather than to attempt in a piecemeal fashion to amend the exist-
ing laws to conform to some type of uniform blue sky law.
DWIGHT W. MILLER
FEDERAL TAXATION
Primarily due to congressional efforts to formulate an acceptable tax relief
program for 1963, there has been little major legislation enacted recently in
the field of federal taxation. It is important, however, to note that a recent
amendment to Section 214 of the Internal Revenue Code facilitating the use
of the child care deduction for deserted wives will become effective during
the present taxable year.'
This amendment manifests congressional cognizance of the financial
problems which often confront a deserted wife. It is primarily designed to
grant a deserted wife the care expense deduction privileges which were for-
merly afforded only to widows, widowers, or women legally separated from
their husbands under a decree of divorce or separate maintenance. 2 The
amendment does not, however, affect any provisions applicable to other per-
63 Uniform Securities Act 402 (a) (11).
64 Loss, op. cit. supra note 38, at 361.
1 77 Stat. 4 (1963). This section amends Mt. Rev Code of 1954, 214(c)(3) by
adding 214(c) (3) (B). Section 214(c)(3) now reads:
DETERMINATION OF STATUS—A woman shall not be considered as
married if (A) she is legally separated from her spouse under a decree of divorce
or of separate maintenance at the close of the taxable year, or (B) she has been
deserted by her husband, does not know his whereabouts (and has not known
his whereabouts at any time during the taxable year), and has applied to a
court of competent jurisdiction for appropriate process to compel him to pay
support or otherwise to comply with the law or a judicial order, as determined
under regulations of the Secretary or his delegate. (Added provisions italicized.)
The added provisions became effective for taxable years ending after April 2, 1963.
2 5. Rep. No. 69, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963), U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 394
(April 20, 1963).
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sons entitled to the child care deduction under section 214. Nor does the
amendment alter the existing rule allowing a $600 maximum deduction where
the expenses were incurred by the taxpayer for the care of certain dependents
in order to enable the taxpayer to remain gainfully employed, or in active
search of gainful employment?
Prior to the amendment, section 214 lacked any specific provisions for
special treatment of a deserted wife. As such, she was left with no alternative
but to claim the care deduction as the "working wife" of a self-supporting
husband.' This unfortunate situation unavoidably subjected her to provisions
curtailing the use of the deduction, these provisions having primarily been
intended to place limitations upon married couples filing jointly. 3 Being
classified as a "working wife" resulted in the following problems for the
deserted wife. First, the $600 maximum deduction could be reduced by any
amount of the combined adjusted gross income exceeding $4,500 (based on a
joint return), the entire deduction being completely lost where the combined
adjusted gross income exceeded $5,100. 3 Secondly, it was mandatory that a
deserted wife (like a "working wife" having a self-supporting husband) file
a joint return with her spouse. 7
 This requirement unfortunately precluded her
from claiming the deduction in any instance where she was unable to locate
her husband. •
The unrealistic treatment previously accorded deserted wives was
exemplified in the case of Jean L. Conti Price. 8 The failure of a wife, living
apart from her estranged husband, to file a joint return deprived her of the
right to claim the child care deduction. The court, without considering the
possibility of a deserted wife's inability to locate her husband, held that for
tax purposes she was still considered a married "working wife" under section
214(b) (2), and thus she was precluded from the deduction unless she filed a
joint return as required under section 214(b) (2) (A).9
3 Mt. Rev. Code of 1954, § 214(a). The original purpose of the child care de-
duction was to afford relief in situations where a wife was compelled to work in order
to provide at least subsistence standards in the household, and at the same time obli-
gated to pay for the care of her children in order to enable her to remain working out-
side her home.
4 mt. Rev. Code of 1954, § 214(b)(2). Prior to the amendment, deserted wives
failed to qualify for special status treatment as an unmarried woman as determined
under § 214(c) (3), and thus were treated as a married "working wife" and subjected
to the provisions of § 214 (b)(2).
5 The limitations imposed upon working wives are found in subsections 214(b)
(2)(A), and 214(6) (2)(B).
6 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 214(b)(2)(B). E.g., where a "working wife" incurred
$800 child care expenses during the taxable year, and the combined adjusted gross in-
come when filed jointly with her husband was $4,900; the allowable deduction under
214(b) (2) (B) would be $200. ($600 maximum deduction, less the amount of the
adjusted gross income exceeding $4,500 ($400)). Thus where the combined adjusted
gross income exceeds $5,100, the entire $600 deduction will be lost. See examples 2 and
3, Treas. Reg. § 1.214-1(c) (1956).
7 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 214(6)(2)(A).
8 34 T.C. 163 ( 1 960).
9 Prior to the amendment, only a woman having the status of an "unmarried woman"
under § 214(c)(3), as included under the definition of "widowers" under § 214(c) (2),
would qualify for special treatment extended to single women. Those qualifying as such
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The need to re-evaluate the status of a deserted wife under section
214 was clearly illustrated from a 1958 revenue ruling" where an abandoned
wife under a North Carolina support decreed was denied special status
treatment under section 214(c) (3). The holding interpreted the support de-
cree as one which was primarily intended to enforce "the husband's marital
duty to support his wife . . .", and not one resulting in a legal separation
or separate maintenance; both of which were exclusively required under
section 214(c) (3) for special status treatment as an unmarried woman.12
Therefore, the failure to qualify, as such, subjected her to treatment as a
"working wife" under section 214(b)(2) and the ensuing limitations at-
tached to that classification.
The new amendment appears to reflect an attempt by Congress to
correct these former unjust impediments by equating the status of a deserted
wife with that of an unmarried woman," who shares similar "care" and
financial problems. 14 In order to qualify for such treatment, a deserted wife
must show (1) that she has in fact been deserted by her husband; (2) that
she had no knowledge of her husband's whereabouts at any time during the
taxable year; and (3) that she has applied to a court of competent juris-
diction for a support decree.15 If a deserted wife meets the foregoing qualifica-
tions, she will be allowed a maximum $600 deduction for care expenses for
certain dependents regardless of her total income, without having to file
jointly with her husband, and without being subjected to the reduction
limitation for adjusted gross income exceeding $4,500. 16
It should be noted that there are several provisions under section 214
affecting both deserted wives and other persons covered thereunder which re-
quire clarification. First, a deserted wife apparently will lose her special
status privileges if she fails to apply to a court of competent jurisdiction for
a support decree ("or otherwise to comply with the law . . . as determined
under regulations of the Secretary . . ."), 17 or if it is shown that she was
in fact aware of her husband's whereabouts during the taxable year. In
either case, the benefits conferred upon her by the amendment will be lost,
and she will again become subjected to the limitations imposed upon "work-
ing wives" under section 214(b)(2). 18 Second, special attention should be
directed to the fact that the "care" expenses deductible under section 214
were not required to file jointly as a "working wife" under § 214(h) (2) (A), or subjected
to the reduction limitation for adjusted gross income exceeding $4,500 as required under
§ 214(6) (2) (B).
10 Rev. Rul. 321, 1958-1 Cum. Bull. 35.
11 The decree was issued pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-16 (Cum. Supp. 1957).
The ruling also referred to similar support decrees of other states.
12 Supra note 10, at 37.
13 Supra notes 1 and 9.
14 Most of the factors precluding the availability of the deduction in Jean L. Conti
Price and Rev. Rul. 58-321, supra notes 8 & 10, have been removed by the new
classification of a deserted wife's status under § 214(c) (3) (B).
13 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 214(c) (3) (B), supra note 1.
10 Deserted wives will now qualify for special status treatment as a single woman
under Treas. Reg. § 1.214-1(6)(4) (1956).
11 1M. Rev. Code of 1954, § 214(c) (3)(B), supra note 1.
18 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 214(6)(2) (A) & (B).
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must still be incurred for purposes of allowing the taxpayer to remain "gain-
fully employed", or to search for such employment." Third, for expenses to
qualify for the deduction it must be shown that they were expended not
only to permit the taxpayer to remain "gainfully employed", but also for
the "primary purpose of assuring the dependent's well being and protec-
tion."2° Generally, "amounts expended to provide food, clothing or educa-
tion are not, in themselves, amounts expended for 'care' so as to be deductible
under section 214," but may be considered as part of the total amount
expended for "care" when furnished by nurseries, day camps, or other
similar baby-sitter services and organizations 24
 Fourth, although commonly
referred to as child care expenses, in addition to children and stepchildren
under 12 (within the meaning of section 152), a taxpayer may claim as a
dependent for the purpose of this section any person that he would be
entitled to claim as a dependent under section 151(e) (1) for a personal
exemption, providing such person is mentally or physically "incapable of
caring for himself." 22
 Fifth, the taxpayer (including a deserted wife) is
limited to a maximum of $600 for all "care" expenses incurred during the
taxable year,23 regardless of the number of care dependents, and regardless
of whether such sums were expended for services performed within or without
the taxpayer's home.24 Finally, this deduction should not be confused with
the $600 personal exemption provided for under section 151. The child care
deduction is listed under "other deductions", and can be claimed only upon
the taxpayer's waiver of the "standard deduction". It can also be claimed in
addition to the $600 personal exemptions claimed under section 151. 25
In light of the fact that the administration's tax program, now pending
before Congress, calls for a further liberalization of the child care deduction
rules; 2° this amendment is at least an indication of Congress' present intent
to provide minimum subsistence standards in financially unsound households,
and to alleviate some of the inequities inadvertently created by the 1954
Code.
ALBERT N. STIEGLIT2
Bs Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 214(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.214-1(f)(4) (1956).
20 Treas. Reg. § 1.214-1(f)(2) (1956).
21 2 CCH 1963 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. II 2031.03.
22 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, 	 214(c) (1)(B).
23 Mt. Rev. Code of 1954, § 214(b)(1)(A).
24 Treas. Reg. § 1.214-1(a) (1956).
25 Section 214(6)(1)(B) denies the care deduction for "any amount paid to an
individual with respect to whom the taxpayer is allowed for his taxable year a deduction
under section 151 (relating to deductions for personal exemptions)." Therefore, if a
deserted wife (or others claiming under section 214) is supporting her father whom she
is claiming for a personal exemption under § 151, she could use the child care deduction
for money paid to her father for the care of her children or other qualified dependents.
See Treas. Reg. § 1214-1(e) (1956).
26 4 P-H Fed. Tax Serv. 32070 (1963).
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